You are here: / / MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD...
, ,

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED, INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (in part) Supreme Court, determined one of defendant’s motions for a directed verdict was premature because plaintiff had not finished presenting proof, a second motion for a directed verdict was properly granted based upon admissions made by plaintiff’s witness, and a cross-claim based upon an indemnification agreement failed because the agreement purported to indemnify a party for its own negligence (in violation of the General Obligations Law). With respect to the premature motion for a directed verdict, the court wrote:

​

“Any party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or issue upon the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions.”

In interpreting this provision, this Court has held that the requirement that a party opposing a directed verdict motion must have closed its presentation of evidence “must be strictly enforced” (Griffin v Clinton Green S., LLC, 98 AD3d 41, 46 [1st Dept 2012]). Further, we have held that “the grant of a dismissal [pursuant to CPLR 4401] prior to the close of the opposing party’s case will be reversed as premature, even if the ultimate success of the opposing party in the action is improbable” … . This Court in Griffin emphasized the importance of each party being “afford[ed] . . . a day in court” … . * * *

​

[Defendant] essentially asks us to endorse a system whereby a party can make a directed verdict motion at any time during trial, so long as the party opposing the motion has put in some unspecified quantum of evidence that, though it may not have been everything the opposing party intended to put in, was sufficient for the trial court to determine that there were no issues of fact and it could decide for the movant as a matter of law. We decline to do so. 11 Essex St. Corp. v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2017 NY Slip Op 06709, First Dept 9-28-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION FOR  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))CONTRACT LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT  (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
Punitive Damages Award Not Recoverable in Subsequent “Bad Faith Failure to Settle” Case Against Insurer
Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine Can Apply to an Elevator Maintenance Company Even Where there Is No Proof the Company Had Actual or Constructive Notice of Elevator Misleveling
Criteria for Balancing the Need for a Public Trial and First Amendment Rights (Freedom of the Press) With the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial Discussed in Some Detail—Here the Court’s Sealing of Some Records and Closures of the Courtroom Reflected a Proper Discretionary Balance
ALTHOUGH CPLR 2104 DOES NOT APPLY TO STIPULATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, THE STIPULATION SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF, IN WHICH HE AGREED TO RETIRE IN RETURN FOR THE CESSATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS, WAS ENFORCEABLE UNDER CONTRACT PRINCIPLES DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF HEART (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENSE COUNSEL MOVED TO SUPPRESS AN UNNOTICED EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT AFTER BEING TOLD THE IDENTIFICATION WOULD BE PRECLUDED IF HE DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS; DEFENSE COUNSEL INTRODUCED DEFENDANT’S MUG SHOT DESPITE THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PHOTO ID; DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT OBJECT TO A DETECTIVE’S IMPROPER IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT IN A BLURRY VIDEO; THE MOTION TO VACATE DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS FALLING OBJECT CASE; QUESTION OF FACT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, ENTERED BY THE CLERK AT THE DIRECTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT AFTER REVERSAL, DOES NOT BRING UP TRIAL INTERLOCUTORY RULINGS FOR APPEAL.
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS A GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER SAFETY CONDITIONS IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) LADDER-FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS READY WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE... RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT NOT INDEPENDENTLY ASSESSED BY HEARING...