You are here: / / MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD...
, ,

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED, INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (in part) Supreme Court, determined one of defendant’s motions for a directed verdict was premature because plaintiff had not finished presenting proof, a second motion for a directed verdict was properly granted based upon admissions made by plaintiff’s witness, and a cross-claim based upon an indemnification agreement failed because the agreement purported to indemnify a party for its own negligence (in violation of the General Obligations Law). With respect to the premature motion for a directed verdict, the court wrote:

​

“Any party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or issue upon the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions.”

In interpreting this provision, this Court has held that the requirement that a party opposing a directed verdict motion must have closed its presentation of evidence “must be strictly enforced” (Griffin v Clinton Green S., LLC, 98 AD3d 41, 46 [1st Dept 2012]). Further, we have held that “the grant of a dismissal [pursuant to CPLR 4401] prior to the close of the opposing party’s case will be reversed as premature, even if the ultimate success of the opposing party in the action is improbable” … . This Court in Griffin emphasized the importance of each party being “afford[ed] . . . a day in court” … . * * *

​

[Defendant] essentially asks us to endorse a system whereby a party can make a directed verdict motion at any time during trial, so long as the party opposing the motion has put in some unspecified quantum of evidence that, though it may not have been everything the opposing party intended to put in, was sufficient for the trial court to determine that there were no issues of fact and it could decide for the movant as a matter of law. We decline to do so. 11 Essex St. Corp. v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2017 NY Slip Op 06709, First Dept 9-28-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION FOR  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))CONTRACT LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT  (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS A GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER SAFETY CONDITIONS IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) LADDER-FALL CASE (FIRST DEPT).
PETITIONER SOUGHT A TEMPORARY LICENSE PURSUANT TO RPAPL 881 TO ENTER RESPONDENT’S ADJOINING PROPERTY TO INSTALL PROTECTIONS PRIOR TO DEMOLITION WORK ON PETITIONER’S BUILDINGS; RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO FULL INDEMNIFICATION FOR ANY DAMAGE (AS OPPOSED TO INDEMNIFICATION “TO THE EXTENT COVERED BY INSURANCE”) AND TO REASONABLE EXPERT’S AND ATTORNEY’S FEES (SECOND DEPT).
PURSUANT TO THE HOUSING STABILITY AND TENANT PROTECTION ACT (HSTPA) AND NEW YORK CITY’S RENT STABILIZATION LAW (RSL), THE TENANT WAS ENTITLED TO BUT WAS NEVER OFFERED A RENEWAL LEASE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PRIOR LEASE SIGNED BY HIS GRANDMOTHER; THE LANDLORD’S HOLDOVER AND EVICTION PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
Criteria for an “Open and Obvious” Defense and an “Intervening or Superseding Cause” Defense Described—Effect of Plaintiff’s Intoxication and Lack of Memory Re: the Accident Discussed
AN ESCAPE LADDER BOLTED TO THE CEILING OF A PERSONNEL HOIST DETACHED AND FELL ON PLAINTIFF; PLAITIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​
CITY DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR FAILURE TO PRESERVE PRE-ACCIDENT POLICE COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS POLICE-VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE BECAUSE THE CITY DEFENDANTS WERE AWARE THEY WOULD PROBABLY ASSERT AN EMERGENCY DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT).
Aeration Tank Constituted an Unventilated Confined Area Requiring Air Quality Monitoring
SUPREME COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE GUNPOINT ARREST UNLAWFUL AND PROPERLY SUPPRESSED THE SEIZED ITEMS AND THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF DID NOT DEMONSTRATE HE WAS READY WILLING AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE... RELIABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT NOT INDEPENDENTLY ASSESSED BY HEARING...