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A STAY OF THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS WAS TRIGGERED BY THE SUSPENSION OF DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY; BUT THE APPEARANCE OF NEW COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT TO OPPOSE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAIVED THE PROTECTION OF THE STAY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon,, determined the defendant in this foreclosure action waived any stay of proceedings under CPLR 321(c) triggered by her attorney’s suspension:

CPLR 321(c) … provides any adversary party with a mechanism for lifting a stay—by serving a notice upon the nonrepresented party to obtain a new attorney.  Thus there are … two ways in which a CPLR 321(c) stay may be lifted. One way is if the party that lost its counsel retains new counsel at its own initiative, or otherwise communicates an intention to proceed pro se … . The second way is by means of the above-described notice procedure … . …

… [T]he plaintiff moved … for summary judgment … and for an order of reference … at a time when no event allowing for the lifting of the CPLR 321(c) stay had yet occurred. No new attorney had yet appeared on behalf of the defendant, and there is no indication that the defendant had elected to proceed pro se … . Moreover, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment without having served a CPLR 321(c) notice demanding the appointment of new counsel and without abiding by the statutorily mandated 30-day waiting period that follows the notice.

Nevertheless, the defendant’s new counsel formally appeared in the action six days after the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was filed, submitted papers in opposition to that motion, and cross-moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant, all within the original or adjusted briefing schedule. … The appearance and activities of the defendant’s new counsel operated, in effect, as a waiver of the protections otherwise afforded to the defendant by CPLR 321(c) … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Kurian, 2021 NY Slip Op 04509, Second Dept 7-31-21

 

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