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PROBATION CONDITIONS PROHIBITING POSSESSION OF A COMPUTER AND A CELL PHONE WERE NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE; DEFENDANT HAD PLED GUILTY TO ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ABUSE FIRST DEGREE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined some of the conditions of probation prohibiting defendant from possessing a computer and cell phone were not warranted. Defendant pled guilty to attempted sexual abuse first degree:

In addition to prohibiting defendant from maintaining an account on a social networking site, condition 34 also prohibits defendant from purchasing, possessing, controlling, or having access to any computer or device with internet capabilities and from maintaining any “internet account,” including email, without permission from his probation officer. Condition 35 prohibits defendant from owning, renting, or possessing a cell phone with picture taking capabilities or cameras or video recorders for capturing images. In light of defendant’s lack of a prior criminal history and the lack of evidence in the record linking defendant’s use of technology to the underlying offense, we conclude that those parts of condition 34 and the entirety of condition 35 do not relate to the goals of probation and thus are not enforceable on that ground … . People v Blanco-Ortiz, 2021 NY Slip Op 04447, Fourth Dept 7-16-21

 

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