You are here: / / MOTHER’S REFUSING TO SIGN MEDICAL CONSENT FORMS FOR PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT...

MOTHER’S REFUSING TO SIGN MEDICAL CONSENT FORMS FOR PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT OF HER CHILD DID NOT CONSTITUTE NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) did not demonstrate mother had neglected the child by refusing to sign medical consent forms which resulted in the child being discharged from the psychiatric care at the Richmond University Medical Center (RUMC):

ACS failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother neglected the child. ACS did not establish that the mother’s failure to sign the admissions paperwork for the child’s stay at RUMC, or her failure to consent to the child being given a drug known as Risperdal, impaired, or caused imminent risk of impairment of, the child’s physical, mental, or emotional condition. Contrary to the allegation in the petition, the child’s medical records showed that she was discharged from RUMC because her condition had stabilized and she did not appear to be a threat to herself or others. Moreover, the mother agreed with the recommendation that the child receive follow-up outpatient care, and at the time that the child was discharged, the mother had two such appointments scheduled. As to the mother’s failure to consent to the child being given Risperdal, the medical records showed that, despite not being given this medication, the child’s condition stabilized during her hospitalization such that she was able to be released safely for outpatient treatment. ACS presented no evidence that outpatient treatment without the use of Risperdal was not “an acceptable course of treatment in light of all of the surrounding circumstances” … . Matter of Nabil H. A. (Vinda F.), 2021 NY Slip Op 04129, Second Dept 6-30-21

 

You might also like
EDUCATION LAW REQUIRES THAT PLAINTIFF FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR AN ACTION AGAINST THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF THE NYS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (SECOND DEPT)
Criteria for Shareholder’s Derivative Action and Shareholder’s Action to Inspect Corporate Books Explained
PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS WAS WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS BUT DID NOT WARRANT SUPREME COURT’S STRIKING THE COMPLAINT; THE APPELLATE DIVISION IMPOSED EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS AND ORDERED PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL TO PAY DEFENDANT $3000 (SECOND DEPT). ​
PRODUCTION OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE AND ENDORSEMENTS WAS “MATERIAL AND NECESSARY” TO THE DETERMINATION WHETHER THE BANK HAS STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS EJECTMENT ACTION, DEFENDANT-TENANT’S “FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION,” “WAIVER,” “CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION,” “BREACH OF COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT,” “IMPROPER NOTICE OF DEFAULT,” AND “TRESPASS” AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
THE POLICE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LAWFUL BASIS FOR IMPOUNDING DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AND CONDUCTING AN INVENTORY SEARCH; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE JUDGE CAN PROPERLY AWARD COUNSEL FEES TO PETITIONER BASED UPON RESPONDENT’S VIOLATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION, A HEARING IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS PROCEEDING UNDER CPLR ARTICLE 52 TO ENFORCE A MONEY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE STATE INSURANCE FUND TO THE EXTENT THE STATE IS A GARNISHEE (SECOND DEPT)

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

ALTHOUGH AN ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER CAN BE LIABLE FOR A DANGEROUS CONDITION... PETITIONER’S INCAPACITATING INJURIES EXCUSED THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE...