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Mother’s Parental Rights Should Not Have Been Terminated Based Upon a Violation of a Suspended Judgment—Best Interests of the Child Should Have Been Considered

The Second Department determined Family Court erred when it terminated the mother's parental rights after she violated a suspended judgment (imposing drug-related conditions) without taking into account the best interests of the child.  The evidence supported the conclusion that terminating the mother's parental rights was not in the best interests of the child:

The Family Court may revoke a suspended judgment after a hearing if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence adduced, that the parent failed to comply with one or more of the conditions of the suspended judgment … . The best interests of the child, however, remain relevant at all stages of a permanent neglect proceeding, including at the revocation of a suspended judgment … . Here, the preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that the mother failed to comply with certain conditions set forth in the suspended judgment. However, the evidence did not support the Family Court's conclusion that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights.  Matter of Phoenix DA …, 2014 NY Slip OP 08638, 2nd Dept 12-10-14

 

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THE CRACK OVER WHICH INFANT PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED WAS DEEMED TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW (SECOND DEPT).
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