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IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVOLVING A FIRE TRUCK DRIVEN BY A VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER, THE FIRE DISTRICT CAN BE HELD TO A NEGLIGENCE, AS OPPOSED TO A RECKLESS DISREGARD, STANDARD PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-B (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, over a dissent, determined the defendant volunteer fire district could be held liable for a traffic accident under a negligence, as opposed to reckless disregard, standard, pursuant General Municipal Law 205-b. The dissent argued the reckless disregard standard applies because General Municipal Law 205-b does not specify a particular standard of care:

Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-b, “fire districts created pursuant to law shall be liable for the negligence of volunteer firefighters duly appointed to serve therein in the operation of vehicles owned by the fire district upon the public streets and highways of the fire district, provided such volunteer firefighters, at the time of any accident or injury, were acting in the discharge of their duties.” Thus, contrary to the Fire District’s contention, it was not limited to liability for conduct rising to the level of “reckless disregard” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), and could be held liable for the ordinary negligence of a volunteer firefighter operating the Fire District’s vehicle … . Anderson v Commack Fire Dist., 2021 NY Slip Op 03821, Second Dept 6-16-21

 

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