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DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined charges relating to a forged deed were not protected the by the transactional immunity afforded grand jury witnesses. Defendant had testified before a grand jury about a burglary at real property she claimed to own. Subsequently defendant was charged with grand larceny (stealing the real property), possessing a forged deed, filing the forged deed and perjury (in the grand jury proceeding). The Second Department determined the grand larceny count was properly dismissed because it directly related to defendant’s testimony before the grand jury (claiming  that she owned the real property). However, the charges forged deed charges were not related to her grand jury testimony and therefore those charges were reinstated:

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The defendant’s grand jury testimony that she was the owner of the real property would be relevant to establishing the defendant’s alleged intent to deprive the rightful owners of the real property … . Thus, the defendant testified to the “transaction, matter or thing” for which she stands indicted … , and her testimony may “tend to a conviction when combined with proof of other circumstances which others may supply” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly found that the defendant’s testimony conferred immunity upon her from prosecution of grand larceny in the second degree. * * *

… [A]lthough the defendant testified that she owned the real property, she did not testify how she purportedly came into ownership of the real property. Her claim of ownership is not relevant to establishing her knowledge that the deed to the real property was forged, her intent to use that deed to defraud another person, her presentment of the deed to the City Register, or her belief that the deed would be accepted for filing … , and thus, does not “tend to a conviction when combined with proof of other circumstances which others may supply” … . Under these circumstances, the defendant was not entitled to immunity from prosecution for criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, and counts two and three of the indictment must be reinstated. People v O’Neal, 2017 NY Slip Op 06461, Second Dept 9-13-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (IMMUNITY, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IMMUNITY, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY,  DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/GRAND JURY (IMMUNITY, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))/IMMUNITY (CRIMINAL LAW, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION BECAUSE HER GRAND JURY TESTIMONY WAS RELATED TO THE GRAND LARCENY CHARGE (STEALING REAL PROPERTY), HOWEVER SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY RE THE FORGED DEED CHARGES (SECOND DEPT))

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