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PLAINTIFF’S ACTION FOR PRIVATE NUISANCE ALLEGING DEFENDANTS’ AIR CONDITIONING UNIT IS TOO LOUD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the private nuisance cause of action should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff alleged defendants’ air conditioning unit made too much noise:

The elements of a private nuisance cause of action are: “(1) an interference substantial in nature, (2) intentional in origin, (3) unreasonable in character, (4) with a person’s property right to use and enjoy land, (5) caused by another’s conduct in acting or failure to act” … . “[E]xcept for the issue of whether the plaintiff has the requisite property interest, each of the other elements is a question for the jury, unless the evidence is undisputed” … .

Here, the plaintiff stated a cause of action to recover damages for private nuisance by alleging that the defendants’ air conditioning and condenser units generated a noise level exceeding that permitted by the Code of the Town of Hempstead … , which interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his bedroom, garden, and patio, and diminished his property value … . Curry v Matranga, 2021 NY Slip Op 03304, Second Dept 5-26-21

 

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