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FATHER’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT ORDER TERMINATING HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; FATHER ATTEMPTED TO ATTEND THE HEARING, BUT WAS LATE; FATHER WAS ENTITLED TO COUNSEL BUT NONE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED; AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE HE DID NOT ABANDON THE CHILD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s motion to vacate the default order terminating his parental rights should have been granted. Father had appeared on the day of the hearing but it had concluded. In addition father was entitled to counsel and there was evidence father had not abandoned the child:

A parent seeking to vacate an order entered upon their default in a termination of parental rights proceeding must establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought in the petition (see CPLR 5015[a][1] …).

Here, the father presented a reasonable excuse for his failure to timely appear at the May 28, 2019 fact-finding hearing. The father did in fact appear in court on the hearing date, but the proceedings had already concluded. This was the father’s first appearance in the proceeding, and there is no indication that the father was notified by the Family Court or counsel of the hearing … . Indeed, the father was unrepresented by counsel at that time, and claims that he was not offered assigned counsel on May 28, 2019. The father had a right to the assistance of counsel in this proceeding, in which he faced a potential termination of his parental rights … . Parental rights may not be curtailed without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, which includes the assistance of counsel … .

… Social Services Law § 384-b(5)(a) provides that “a child is ‘abandoned’ by his parent if such parent evinces an intent to forego his or her parental rights and obligations as manifested by his or her failure to visit the child and communicate with the child or agency, although able to do so and not prevented or discouraged from doing so by the agency.” Abandonment must be proven by clear and convincing evidence … . Termination of parental rights is authorized by Social Services Law § 384-b(4)(b) when the parent abandoned the child for a period of six months immediately prior to the date of the filing of the petition. Here, the father’s allegations regarding his attempts to contact the agency and visit with the child potentially extend into the relevant six-month period prior to the October 2018 petition. Matter of Jonathan N., Jr. (Jonathan N., Sr.), 2021 NY Slip Op 03034, Second Dept 5-12-21

 

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