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THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST A TOWN POLICE OFFICER ARE CONTROLLED BY THE TOWN LAW AND THE TOWN POLICE MANUAL, NOT THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the disciplinary proceedings against a town police officer are controlled by the Town Law and the town police manual, not by the Civil Service Law and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA):

… [W]e agree with respondents that the disciplinary procedures set forth in the police manual are controlling, we further agree with respondents that the court erred in directing them to resolve petitioner’s disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 and the CBA … . To the extent that the police manual contains references to Civil Service Law § 75, it is well settled that section 75 did not repeal or modify Town Law § 155 … . Indeed, “Civil Service Law § 76 (4) states that ‘[n]othing contained in section [75] or [76] of this chapter shall be construed to repeal or modify any general, special or local’ preexisting laws” … , and Town Law § 155, which gives towns the power and authority to adopt rules regarding police discipline, was enacted prior to Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 … . Thus, where, as here, a town board has adopted disciplinary rules pursuant to Town Law § 155, those rules are controlling and Civil Service Law § 75 and any collective bargaining agreement are inapplicable … . Matter of Town of Tonawanda Police Club, Inc. v Town of Tonawanda, 2021 NY Slip Op 02959, Fourth Dept 5-7-21

 

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