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THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERED WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AFFORDED YOUTHUL OFFENDER STATUS; SENTENCE VACATED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, vacating defendant’s sentence, remitted the matter for a consideration of whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender status:

CPL 720.20(1) requires “that there be a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant fails to request it, or agrees to forgo it as part of a plea bargain” … . The Supreme Court was required to determine on the record whether the defendant, whose conviction for robbery in the first degree constituted an armed felony … , was an “eligible youth” … , by considering the presence or absence of the factors set forth in CPL 720.10(3) and, if so, whether he should be afforded youthful offender status … . As the People concede, the record does not demonstrate that the court made that determination. People v Hill, 2021 NY Slip Op 02422, Second Dept 4-21-21

 

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THE JUDGE’S LAW CLERK, A FORMER ASS’T DA, DISCUSSED DEFENDANT’S... APPEAL HELD AND MATTER REMITTED TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO MOVE TO VACATE HIS GUILTY...