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THE CHILDREN DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN LITIGATION REGARDING THEIR PARENTS’ PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT; THEREFORE THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE A MOTION CONCERNING THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the children did not have standing to participate in the litigation of financial matters of their parents’ divorce, including the litigation concerning whether the prenuptial agreement should be set aside. Therefore the attorney for the child (AFC) did not have the authority to make a motion regarding the prenuptial agreement:

Although children have certain rights with respect to issues of child support, custody, and visitation in matrimonial actions … , children do not have a right to participate in the litigation of financial matters of their parents’ divorce relating to maintenance and/or equitable distribution.

Moreover, while “children’s attorneys are expected to participate fully in proceedings in which they are appointed” … , such participation is limited to matters in which the children are the “subject of the proceeding” (Family Court Act § 249; see Judiciary Law § 35[7]). Given that children are not bound by agreements entered into by their parents , they are not the “subject” of proceedings to determine the validity of their parents’ prenuptial agreement related to maintenance and equitable distribution (Family Court Act § 249). Mahadeo v Mahadeo, 2021 NY Slip Op 02286, Second Dept 4-14-21

 

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