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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED THE COURT’S AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE MOTHER’S PARENTAL ACCESS; THE JUDGE LEFT IT TO MOTHER AND HER CHILD TO DETERMINE MOTHER’S PARENTAL ACCESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge should not not have left it to mother and her child to determine when mother will have parental access. The child lives with stepmother who is married to father. Father, who is incarcerated, did not want mother to have parental access:

“A court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child” … . “While a child’s views are to be considered in determining custody or parental access, they are not determinative” … . Moreover, “[a]n access provision which is conditioned on the desires of [a] child[ ] tends to defeat the right of parental access” … .

Here, the order appealed from directed that the mother was only entitled to parental access with the child as often as she and the child agree. That provision effectively conditions the mother’s parental access on the child’s wishes and leaves the determination as to whether there should be any parental access at all to the child. Moreover, the Family Court’s directive as to parental access creates the potential for influence upon the child, since the stepmother, with whom he lives, is married to the father, who is opposed to the mother having any parental access with the child. Thus, the court’s directive as to parental access must be set aside … . Matter of Clezidor v Lexune, 2021 NY Slip Op 01409, Second Dept 3-10-21

 

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