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HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLAIMS DID NOT ALLEGE DISCRIMINATION; INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DOES NOT APPLY TO TERMINATION OF AT WILL EMPLOYMENT; WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS AGAINST AN EMPLOYER; PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION OR BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that several of plaintiff’s causes of action, as well as claims for punitive damages, should have been dismissed. Plaintiff’s lawsuit stemmed from alleged wrongful conduct in terminating the plaintiff’s employment and evicting him from a work-provided apartment:

… [P]laintiff alleges that he engaged in “protected activity” when his attorney sent a letter to one or more defendants about an altercation between plaintiff and a neighbor. We agree with defendants that … sending the letter did not constitute “protected activity” because the letter did not suggest, much less allege, that anyone had engaged in “unlawful discrimination,” i.e., conduct prohibited by the [Human Rights Law]. …

… [I]t is well established that “[t]ort causes of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . ‘cannot be allowed in circumvention of the unavailability of a tort claim for wrongful discharge or the contract rule against liability for discharge of an at-will employee’ ” … . …

With respect to the fifth and eighth causes of action (negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, training, and supervision, respectively), it is well established that workers’ compensation benefits are the “exclusive remedy for . . . injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of [a person’s] employer and fellow employee” … . …

Punitive damages are not available for the employment discrimination claims in the complaint … . … [T]he breach of contract claim … does not qualify for punitive damages because plaintiff does not allege that [the] alleged breach of contract was ” ‘aimed at the public generally’ ” … . Miller v National Prop. Mgt. Assoc., Inc., 2021 NY Slip Op 00729, Fourth Dept 2-5-21

 

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DEFENDANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA PRIOR... FOR CAUSE CHALLENGES TO TWO JURORS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).