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SURROGATE’S COURT HAD THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE, NUNC PRO TUNC, A METHOD OF SERVICE ON AN OUT-OF-STATE PARTY ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT PRIOR COURT APPROVAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Duffy, in a matter of first impression, determined Surrogate’s Court had the authority to approve, nunc pro tunc, service upon an out-of-state party by a method which was not in compliance with the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA). Here the attempts at service which complied with the SCPA were unsuccessful. Without procuring permission from court, the executor served the party by first class mail and the letter was not returned. Surrogate’s court approved the service by mail nunc pro tunc:

… [S]ince we find that the Surrogate’s Court had the authority to deem service on the appellant complete, nunc pro tunc, pursuant to SCPA 307(3)(b), which allows for substituted service such as regular first-class mail, the remaining issue to address is whether the court properly determined that such substituted service was valid; to wit, whether service on the appellant by regular first-class mail met the requirements of due process such that personal jurisdiction over the appellant was established … . * * *

… [T]he Executor undertook diligent but unsuccessful attempts to serve the appellant pursuant to SCPA 307(2) before regular first-class mail service was undertaken. Moreover, this is not a circumstance where the appellant had no knowledge of the proceeding that was taking place. Here, the appellant acknowledged that she (1) received a copy of the notice of probate at the time of the commencement of the probate proceeding, (2) immediately retained an attorney to represent her interests in the probate proceeding, and (3) subsequently received a copy of the will. The appellant was also aware of the scheduled hearing on July 12, 2017, in advance of that date, and neither she nor her attorney at that time chose to attend the proceeding. Thus, we find that the substituted service on the appellant by regular first-class mail satisfied the requirements of due process … . Matter of Pollina, 2020 NY Slip Op 08068, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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