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APPELLANT’S LATE APPEARANCE FOR A HEARING DID NOT JUSTIFY A DEFAULT FINDING.

The Second Department determined Family Court should not have denied a motion to vacate an order of protection. Appellant had been slightly late for a hearing on her sister’s request for an order of protection and the order was issued based upon appellant’s default:

In this family offense proceeding, the Family Court issued an order of protection against the appellant and in favor of her sister upon the appellant’s failure to appear at a hearing. The appellant moved to vacate the order of protection entered upon her default, and the Family Court denied her motion. * * *

The Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to vacate the order of protection entered upon her default in appearing at the hearing. The appellant showed no willfulness or intent to default, where she was minimally tardy to the hearing, and the tardiness might have been due, at least in part, to crowded conditions at the courthouse, she attended prior court appearances, she engaged in motion practice through her attorney, and she participated in multiple preparatory conferences with her attorney … . Also, the appellant moved to vacate the order of protection relatively soon after it was issued. Under the circumstances, the appellant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for her failure to appear at the hearing. Further, the appellant demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the petition …. . Matter of Williams v Williams, 2017 NY Slip Op 01873, 2nd Dept 3-15-17

 

FAMILY LAW (APPELLANT’S LATE APPEARANCE FOR A HEARING DID NOT JUSTIFY A DEFAULT FINDING)/DEFAULT (FAMILY LAW, APPELLANT’S LATE APPEARANCE FOR A HEARING DID NOT JUSTIFY A DEFAULT FINDING)

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