You are here: / / THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS USURY, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACTION...
, , ,

THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS USURY, FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACTION FINANCED THE SALE OF JEWELRY OVER MANY MONTHS, MARKETING THE SALES AS A WAY FOR CONSUMERS TO IMPROVE THEIR CREDIT; THE MAJORITY HELD THE BUSINESS MET THE DEFINITION OF A “CREDIT SERVICES BUSINESS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 458-H (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a dissent, determined the cause of action which alleged defendants operated a “credit services business” within the meaning of General Business Law 458-h. The defendants financed the purchase of jewelry, claiming that such financing was a means of improving consumers’ credit record:

Plaintiff commenced this action alleging various claims for usury, common-law and statutory fraud, and deceptive business practices. …

A “credit services business” is defined as “any person who sells, provides, or performs, or represents that he can or will sell, provide or perform, a service for the express or implied purpose of improving a consumer’s credit record, history, or rating or providing advice or assistance to a consumer with regard to the consumer’s credit record history or rating in return for the payment of a fee” (§ 458-b [1]). According to the complaint, defendants “represent[]” that they “provide” a “service” to consumers—specifically, financing the purchase of jewelry—and defendants market such financing as a means “of improving [the] consumer’s credit record.” Put simply, defendants allegedly offer consumers the option of paying for jewelry over many months, and defendants allegedly advertise that financing option as a mechanism to improve the consumer’s credit. In exchange for that financing—i.e., the “service” contemplated by section 458-b (1)—defendants allegedly charge interest. Such interest, we conclude, constitutes a “fee” within the meaning of section 458-b (1). Thus, contrary to the court’s determination and the view of our dissenting colleague, the complaint sufficiently alleges that defendants’ business satisfies the statutory definition of a “credit services business” … . People v Harris Originals of Ny, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 06883, Fourth Dept 11-20-20

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PROCEED PRO SE ON THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL A BUCCAL SWAB FOR DNA TESTING (FOURTH DEPT).
FAILURE TO COMPLETELY EXPLAIN POTENTIAL SENTENCES AND THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE WRITTEN PLEA AGREEMENT AND THE COURT’S EXPLANATION INVALIDATED THE GUILTY PLEA.
Failure to Turn Over Brady Material Until the Day of Trial Required Reversal
FATHER’S PETITION TO MODIFY SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, ALTHOUGH FATHER VOLUNTARILY LEFT A BETTER PAYING JOB IN VIRGINIA, HE DID SO TO BE NEARER TO HIS SON WHO HAD MOVED WITH MOTHER TO NEW YORK FROM VIRGINIA (FOURTH DEPT). ​
An Issue Raised for the First Time on Appeal Will Not Be Considered Where the Defect Could Have Been Cured If Raised Below/Trial Court Can Grant Summary Judgment Based on an Unpleaded Defense
No Notice of Claim Required for Discrimination Claims Against Town
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A VEHICLE THIRD DEGRESS IS A LESSER INCLUSORY COUNT OF GRAND LARCENY FOURTH DEGREE (FOURTH DEPT).
THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE WAS NOT FOR THE “SALE OF GOODS” AND THEREFORE WAS NOT SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE PEOPLE DEMONSTRATED THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE... A WHEEL CAME OFF DEFENDANT’S TRUCK CAUSING A FREAK ACCIDENT INVOLVING...