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THREE OF THE FOUR VEHICULAR HOMICIDE COUNTS WERE MULTIPLICITOUS EVEN THOUGH THEY INVOLVED DIFFERENT SUBDIVISIONS OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 1192; THE DWI AND DWAI COUNTS WERE INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNTS OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE SECOND DEGREE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined three counts of vehicular homicide were multiplicitous and the DWI and DWAI counts were inclusory concurrent counts of vehicular homicide second degree:

While the People contend that each count of vehicular manslaughter required them to prove additional facts that the others did not, in fact, the People were only required to prove that the defendant violated one subdivision of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 in order to prove his guilt under Penal Law § 125.12(1). The People’s election to proceed on a theory that the defendant had violated more than one such subdivision by presenting evidence of his multiple, distinct manners of intoxication was not necessary to establish his guilt … . Thus, a conviction on one count of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree would have been inconsistent with an acquittal on any other count charging the same offense predicated upon a different manner of intoxication … . Accordingly, we agree with the defendant that counts 5, 6, and 7 of the indictment were multiplicitous of count 4 … . Although the dismissal of the multiplicitous counts will not affect the duration of the defendant’s sentence of imprisonment, it is nevertheless appropriate to dismiss these counts in consideration of the stigma attached to the redundant convictions  … .

As the People concede, the defendant’s convictions of driving while intoxicated in violation of subdivisions (2) and (3) of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 and driving while ability impaired under subdivisions (4) and (4-a) of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 are inclusory concurrent counts of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree … . Accordingly, those convictions must also be reversed … . People v O’Brien 2020 NY Slip Op 04971, Second Dept 9-16-20

 

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