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THE DEFENDANT BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF’S ACTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE A MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE BANK PROVED THE DE-ACCELERATION NOTICE WAS PROPERLY TRANSMITTED TO PLAINTIFF, RENDERING THE UNDERLYING FORECLOSURE ACTION TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in plaintiff’s action to discharge and cancel a mortgage pursuant to RPAPL 1501 (4), determined defendant bank demonstrated that the de-acceleration notice were properly transmitted to plaintiff, rendering the defendant bank’s underlying foreclosure action timely:

Wells Fargo’s vice president of loan documentation averred that she was familiar with the mailing practices for such notices; that Wells Fargo followed its practices in this instance; that it was Wells Fargo’s practice to generate and mail such notices to borrowers on the date indicated on the notice; that Wells Fargo’s practice also included keeping a copy of any notice in the corresponding mortgage loan file as a record that the notice was mailed; that the de-acceleration notice was sent on March 11, 2015, by both certified mail and regular mail to the property address and the plaintiff’s address; and that a copy of the de-acceleration notice for each of the two addresses was in the plaintiff’s loan file in accordance with Wells Fargo’s mailing procedures. Contemporaneous business records were attached to the affidavit, showing that a de-acceleration letter was “mailed to property address on 31115.” Through the submission of that evidence, Wells Fargo established that de-acceleration letters were, in fact, sent by regular mail in compliance with the expressed terms of the mortgage … . The mailing procedures described in this case appear identical to those that this Court recognized as satisfactory in Pennymac Holdings, LLC v Lane (171 AD3d 774, 775). Indeed, it is difficult to identify what additional evidence could be expected or required for Wells Fargo to demonstrate that it had transmitted the de-acceleration notice to the proper addresses by regular mail on the date indicated. The de-acceleration notice dated March 11, 2015, was mailed within six years from the debt acceleration occurring upon the commencement of the first action on March 24, 2009. Wells Fargo, in moving for summary judgment, therefore met its prima facie burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint … . Assyag v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2020 NY Slip Op 04908, Second Dept 9-16-20

 

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