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NO DEMONSTRATION A PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT WAS THE ONLY FAIR INTERPRETATION; THEREFORE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY DENIED.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined motions for summary judgment in this contract-interpretation case were properly denied. The contract at issue was an operating agreement for plaintiff limited liability company. Both the majority and the dissent found the contract language ambiguous. The majority concluded reference to extrinsic evidence was necessary, precluding summary judgment. The dissent argued plaintiffs had shown their interpretation was the only fair interpretation:

“It is well settled that a contract must be read as a whole to give effect and meaning to every term . . . Indeed, [a] contract should be interpreted in a way [that] reconciles all [of] its provisions, if possible’ ” … . Therefore, “[e]ffect and meaning must be given to every term of the contract . . . , and reasonable effort must be made to harmonize all of its terms” … . It is equally well settled that “[t]he interpretation of an unambiguous contractual provision is a function for the court . . . , and [t]he proper inquiry in determining whether a contract is ambiguous is whether the agreement on its face is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation . . . To be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of establishing that its construction of the [contract] is the only construction [that] can fairly be placed thereon” … .

Here, neither party established that its interpretation of the Agreement is the only reasonable interpretation thereof … . Consequently, summary judgment is inappropriate at this juncture because a “determination of the intent of the parties depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence” … . Maven Tech., LLC v Vasile, 2017 NY Slip Op 00840, 4th Dept 2-3-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (NO DEMONSTRATION A PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT WAS THE ONLY FAIR INTERPRETATION; THEREFORE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY DENIED)/AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT TERMS (NO DEMONSTRATION A PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT WAS THE ONLY FAIR INTERPRETATION; THEREFORE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY DENIED)

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TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID... FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONVICTION REVERSED.