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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WITHDRAWAL OF PRIOR FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED...
Civil Procedure, Foreclosure

QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WITHDRAWAL OF PRIOR FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED THE REVOCATION OF THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE THE DEBT, THEREBY STOPPING THE RUNNING OF THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The Second Department determined the lender had raised a question of fact whether it had revoked its election to accelerate the debt by withdrawing a prior foreclosure action. The six-year statute of limitations began to run when the debt was accelerated by the first foreclosure action. If the withdrawal of that action revoked the debt acceleration, the statute would have stopped running at that point rendering the instant action timely:

[E]ven if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due, and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt'” … . A lender may revoke its election to accelerate the mortgage, but it must do so by an affirmative act of revocation occurring during the six-year statute of limitations period subsequent to the initiation of the prior foreclosure action … .

… [T]he defendant submitted proof that, on August 16, 2011, [the lender] moved for, and on September 22, 2011, was granted, an order that discontinued the foreclosure action, canceled the notice of pendency, and vacated the judgment of foreclosure and sale it had been granted. The defendant thereby raised a triable issue of fact … as to whether [the lender’s] motion “constituted an affirmative act by the lender to revoke its election to accelerate” …  Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, this case is distinguishable from the cases in which, because “[t]he prior foreclosure action was never withdrawn by the lender, but rather, dismissed . . . by the court, [i]t cannot be said that [the] dismissal by the court constituted an affirmative act by the lender to revoke its election to accelerate” … . NMNT Realty Corp. v Knoxville 2012 Trust, 2017 NY Slip Op 05230, 2nd Dept 6-28-17

 

June 28, 2017
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2017-06-28 11:20:062020-07-29 11:21:44QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WITHDRAWAL OF PRIOR FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING CONSTITUTED THE REVOCATION OF THE ELECTION TO ACCELERATE THE DEBT, THEREBY STOPPING THE RUNNING OF THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
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