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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, A GENERAL SURGEON, PROVIDED AN OPINION IN THE AREA OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, THE EXPERT’S AFFIRMATION DEMONSTRATED THE EXPERT WAS QUALIFIED TO OFFER THE OPINION; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s expert’s affirmation raised a question of fact in this failure-to-diagnose medical malpractice case, even though the affirmation dealt with an area of medicine outside of the expert’s area of practice (general surgery):

… [T]he plaintiffs’ expert’s affirmation was not lacking in probative value because the plaintiffs’ expert was board certified in general surgery rather than internal medicine. A medical expert need not be a specialist in a particular field in order to testify regarding accepted practices in that field; however, the expert must be possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from which it can be assumed that the opinion rendered is reliable … . “Thus, where a physician opines outside his or her area of specialization, a foundation must be laid tending to support the reliability of the opinion rendered” … . “Where no such foundation is laid, the expert’s opinion is of no probative value'” … .

Here, the plaintiffs’ expert’s affirmation sufficiently established that the plaintiffs’ expert was possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge and experience from which it can be assumed that the opinion rendered was reliable … . In particular, the expert demonstrated that he was qualified to render an opinion regarding the symptomology of temporal arteritis, which he characterized as a relatively common disease of the arteries, and as to whether a proper examination and investigation of [the] symptoms was conducted in accordance with accepted medical practices. Kiernan v Arevalo-Valencia, 2020 NY Slip Op 03388, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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