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THE TWO COUNTS OF ROBBERY THIRD WERE CONCURRENT INCLUSORY COUNTS OF THE TWO COUNTS OF ROBBERY SECOND; CONVICTIONS ON THE ROBBERY SECOND COUNTS REQUIRED VACATION OF THE CONVICTIONS ON THE ROBBERY THIRD COUNTS AND THE RELATED SENTENCES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department noted that the two robbery third degree counts were concurrent inclusory counts of the two robbery second degree counts and must be dismissed:

 The two counts of robbery in the third degree were concurrent inclusory counts of the two counts of robbery in the second degree (see CPL 300.30[4]; People v Hutson, 43 AD3d 959, 959; People v Gibson, 295 AD2d 529, 530). A verdict of guilt upon the greater count is deemed a dismissal of every lesser count (see CPL 300.40[3]). Accordingly, we vacate the convictions of robbery in the third degree and the sentences imposed thereon, and dismiss those counts of the indictment … . People v Wingate, 2020 NY Slip Op 03398, Second Dept 6-17-20

 

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