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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S REMARKS ABOUT DEFENDANT’S PRO SE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY PLEA CREATED A CONFLICT OF INTEREST REQUIRING THE ASSIGNMENT OF NEW COUNSEL; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the sentencing court should have assigned new counsel to defendant based upon defense counsel’s remarks about defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw her guilty plea, which created a conflict of interest. The dissenters argued that, before defense made the remarks evincing a conflict of interest, the sentencing judge had denied defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw her plea without prejudice to retain counsel and make a new motion:

After Supreme Court agreed to adjourn sentencing, without having decided defendant’s pro se motion, defense counsel requested that he be permitted to put “a couple [of] things on the record.” Upon receiving the court’s permission, defense counsel proceeded to make several detrimental statements that were adverse and prejudicial to defendant. At this point, a conflict of interest arose between defendant and defense counsel, and Supreme Court was obligated to relieve defense counsel of his representation of defendant … . Supreme Court, however, did not acknowledge that a conflict of interest had arisen or inform defendant that she was entitled to the assignment of new counsel, should she opt to avail herself of that option.

When defendant subsequently appeared in Supreme Court for sentencing, she was accompanied by her original assigned counsel.Once again, Supreme Court did not raise or address the conflict of interest that had previously arisen between defendant and defense counsel, assign new counsel or advise defendant that she was entitled to the assignment of new counsel. Defense counsel requested that defendant be granted an additional adjournment, … stating that defendant had retained a certain named attorney, but that “[t]he funds just [had not] reached him yet.” Without having afforded defendant an opportunity to confer with new counsel regarding her motion to withdraw her plea or having ruled on that motion, Supreme Court denied the adjournment request and proceeded to sentencing. By failing to relieve defense counsel of his representation of defendant once the conflict of interest arose and to either assign new counsel or permit defendant a sufficient opportunity to retain alternate counsel to represent her, Supreme Court deprived defendant of her right to the effective assistance of counsel in connection with her motion to withdraw her plea … . People v Maldonado, 2020 NY Slip Op 02953, Third Dept 5-21-20

 

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