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THE FAMILY COURT ACT ALLOWS COMMITMENT TO JAIL FOR SIX MONTHS FOR EACH VIOLATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION; HERE THE 42-MONTH COMMITMENT WAS AFFIRMED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Ventura, determined father was properly committed to jail for 42 months for 10 violations of orders of protection: Father argued the commitment could not be more than 30 days per violation:

After a hearing on both violation petitions … the Family Court found that the father willfully violated the temporary orders of protection … on 10 separate occasions. In an order of commitment … , the court, inter alia, committed the father to the custody of the New York City Department of Correction for a period of 42 months. The court rejected the father’s argument that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 751, the court only had the authority to sentence him to 30 days in jail for each willful violation. The court determined that it had the authority to impose 10 consecutive six-month terms of incarceration based on its finding that the father committed 10 separate willful violations, which would amount to a maximum permissible sentence of 60 months in jail, and imposed the 42-month term of incarceration. The father appeals, asserting that the maximum permissible sentence was a total of 300 days in jail. * * *

Sections 846-a and 1072 of the Family Court Act provide a “specific punishment or other remedy” for a willful violation of an order of protection issued under article 10 of the Family Court Act (Family Ct Act § 156). Accordingly, Judiciary Law § 751 does not apply, and the Family Court was authorized to commit the father to jail for a period of 42 months upon the court’s finding that, on 10 separate occasions, the father violated temporary orders of protection issued under article 10 of the Family Court Act … . Matter of Austin C. (Rasaan K.C.), 2026 NY Slip Op 04944, Second Dept 8-12-26

 

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