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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT’S SUPPRESSION MOTION RELATED TO A THEFT ON OCTOBER 3 AND DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO A DIFFERENT THEFT ON OCTOBER 1 IN SATISFACTION OF BOTH, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF HIS SUPPRESSION MOTION; THE APPELLATE DIVISION’S DENIAL OF REVIEW REVERSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, reversing the Appellate Division, determined defendant was entitled to appellate review of the denial of his suppression motion even though the suppression motion did not relate to the offense to which defendant pled guilty. The defendant was charged with two thefts from the same residence on different days, a laptop computer taken on October 1 and jewelry taken on October 3. The police stopped the defendant on the street on October 3 and seized the jewelry. The suppression hearing related to that street stop. The defendant pled guilty to the theft of the computer and the jewelry-theft was satisfied by the plea. The Fourth Department held defendant was not entitled to appellate review of the jewelry-related suppression motion because defendant pled to the computer-theft. The case was sent back for review of the denial of the suppression motion:

Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of burglary in the second degree … . The first count related to the laptop computer, taken from a dwelling on October 1, 2014; the second count related to the jewelry, which was taken from the same dwelling on October 3, 2014, the day of the arrest.

Defendant moved to suppress the jewelry, contending that his detention and the seizure of the jewelry violated his right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures …. Following a suppression hearing, with testimony from two of the police officers present at the arrest, Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that the police had “reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed and that the defendant was the perpetrator.”

Defendant, a predicate felony offender who was facing a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison if convicted of both counts of burglary, pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree, in satisfaction of the entire indictment. … [D]efendant pleaded guilty to the October 1 burglary, as charged in the count pertaining to the theft of the laptop computer, in satisfaction of the count charging the October 3 burglary of jewelry, which was the subject of his motion to suppress.  * * *

“[W]hen a conviction is based on a plea of guilty an appellate court will rarely, if ever, be able to determine whether an erroneous denial of a motion to suppress contributed to the defendant’s decision, unless at the time of the plea he states or reveals his reason for pleading guilty” … . * * *

A defendant who pleads guilty to one count will invariably take into consideration that other counts are satisfied by the plea. Importantly, a count satisfied by a guilty plea bears the double jeopardy consequences of a judgment of conviction. The judgment in this case prevents the People from prosecuting defendant again for the October 3, 2014 burglary, even though defendant did not plead to that count … . People v Holz, 2020 NY Slip Op 02682, CtApp 5-7-20

 

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