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TAKING THE APPEAL AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE, THE FIRST DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ACS) DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE APPPELLANT JUVENILE WAS PROPERLY TRANSFERRED FROM A NONSECURE TO A SECURE FACILITY; THE JUVENILE’S MISBEHAVIOR WAS NOT THAT SERIOUS; ACS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT HAD EXHAUSTED LESS SEVERE ALTERNATIVES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, considering an otherwise moot appeal because the issue recurs and juveniles are only placed for a limited amount of time, determined the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) did not demonstrate the need to place the appellant (juvenile) in a secure facility:

Under Family Court Act § 355.1(2), Family Court can modify a dispositional order “upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances” by the agency, to place a youth in a secure facility, if “the respondent has demonstrated by a pattern of behavior that he or she needs a more structured setting and the social services district has considered the appropriateness and availability of a transfer to an alternative non-secure or limited secure facility” … . Notably, behaviors meriting a modification include “disruptions in facility programs; continuously and maliciously destroying property; or, repeatedly committing or inciting other youth to commit assaultive or destructive acts” … .

Here, ACS alleged that two incidents where appellant went absent without consent (AWOC) over the course of two months constituted a “pattern of behavior” warranting his placement in a secure facility. The record reflects that, during the first AWOC incident …, appellant “darted out the front door and ran” from a non-secure facility. During the second incident …, appellant fled through a damaged door at a limited secure facility after other youths broke the door while trying to escape. While this behavior is problematic, it simply does not rise to the level of seriousness reflected in the examples provided in the statute, i.e. “continuously and maliciously destroying property” or “repeatedly committing or inciting other youth to commit assaultive or destructive acts” … .

ACS also failed to show that it first “considered the appropriateness and availability of a transfer to an alternative non-secure or limited secure facility” before seeking modification as it was required to do … . According to ACS policies, “[m]odifications must be considered as an option only when all efforts to avoid the modification have been exhausted.” … ACS did not present any affirmations or provide any witness testimony regarding the limited secure facility’s ability to address appellant’s behavior … . Matter of J.D., 2025 NY Slip Op 06807, First Dept 12-9-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the level of a juvenile’s misbehavior which will justify placement in a secure facility, as well as the less severe alternatives which must be tried or demonstrated ineffective first.

 

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