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DEFENDANTS IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE, I.E., THE DESTRUCTION OR LOSS OF EMAILS; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE THE ANSWER WAS PROPERLY DENIED; HOWEVER, PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AN ADVERSE INFERENCE JURY INSTRUCTION AT TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendants should have been sanctioned for spoliation of evidence, i.e., the failure to preserve relevant emails. The plaintiffs alleged defendants performed faulty renovation-work and thereby breached the renovation contract:

“Under the common-law doctrine of spoliation, when a party negligently loses or intentionally destroys key evidence, the responsible party may be sanctioned under CPLR 3126” … . “The Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining what, if any, sanction should be imposed for spoliation of evidence” … . “A party that seeks sanctions for spoliation of evidence must show that the party having control over the evidence possessed an obligation to preserve it at the time of its destruction, that the evidence was destroyed with a culpable mind, and that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that the trier of fact could find that the evidence would support that claim or defense” … . “‘A culpable state of mind for [the] purposes of a spoliation sanction includes ordinary negligence'” … . Further, “[s]triking a pleading is a drastic sanction to impose in the absence of willful or contumacious conduct and, in order to impose such a sanction, the court ‘will consider the prejudice that resulted from the spoliation to determine whether such drastic relief is necessary as a matter of fundamental fairness'” … . “In contrast, where the moving party has not been deprived of the ability to establish his or her case or defense, a less severe sanction is appropriate” … . “[A]dverse inference charges have been found to be appropriate even in situations where the evidence has been found to have been negligently destroyed” … .

… [P]laintiffs demonstrated that the defendants were on notice that they had an obligation to preserve their email accounts and emails prior to the time that they were lost or destroyed. The plaintiffs also demonstrated that the emails were lost or destroyed with a culpable state of mind and that the emails were sufficiently relevant to the litigation … . Nonetheless, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the drastic remedy of striking the defendants’ answer was not warranted … . Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants’ answer to the extent of directing that an adverse inference charge be issued at trial against the defendants with respect to the loss or destruction of their email accounts and emails … . Dorman v Luva of NY, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 06155, Second Dept 11-12-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a concise explanation of the criteria for finding spoliation of evidence and the appropriate sanctions. In this breach of contract action, plaintiffs demonstrated defendants destroyed or lost relevant emails with a “culpable state of mind.”

 

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