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IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE OF A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION OF THE ACCIDENT; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT; THE ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF STOPPED QUICKLY IN STOP AND GO TRAFFIC IS NOT A NONNEGLIGENT EXPLANATION OF A REAR-END COLLISION (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court in this rear-end collision case, determined plaintiff’s motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict finding defendant rear-driver negligent should have been granted. Plaintiff was stopped when her car was struck from behind. Defendant had struck the car directly behind plaintiff. Although there was evidence plaintiff stopped suddenly (in stop and go traffic), defendant did not offer proof of a nonnegligent explanation for the accident:

We … agree with plaintiff that the court erred in denying that part of her posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of defendant’s negligence (see generally CPLR 4404 [a]). A party is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict where there is “no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [persons] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” … . As relevant here, “[t]he rearmost driver in a chain-reaction collision bears a presumption of responsibility . . . , and . . . a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle, and imposes a duty on the operator of the moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate, [nonnegligent] explanation for the accident” … .

Here, the evidence at trial established that, at the time of the collision, plaintiff and defendant were driving in “stop-and-go” traffic during rush hour on a “wet, [d]rizzly” morning. Plaintiff testified that, at the time of the collision, she had come to a stop because the vehicle in front of her had stopped. Defendant testified that the collision occurred when the vehicle in front of her suddenly stopped; she thought the middle vehicle hit plaintiff’s vehicle first. Defendant tried to turn her vehicle to avoid the collision, but was unsuccessful and collided with the middle vehicle. The driver of the middle vehicle in the chain testified that plaintiff’s vehicle stopped suddenly. He denied initially colliding with plaintiff’s vehicle; it was only after he was hit by defendant that his vehicle collided with plaintiff’s vehicle.

In short, the undisputed evidence at trial established that defendant was the rear-most driver involved in the chain-reaction collisions and, therefore, is presumed negligent absent the proffering of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision. We conclude that there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences establishing such a nonnegligent explanation based on the trial record here. Specifically, under the circumstances of this case, the ” ‘[e]vidence that plaintiff’s lead vehicle was forced to stop suddenly in [stop-and-go] traffic’ ” did not constitute a nonnegligent explanation for the collision sufficient to support the jury’s verdict inasmuch as ” ‘it can easily be anticipated that cars up ahead will make frequent stops in [stop-and-go] traffic’ ” Blatner v Swearengen, 2025 NY Slip Op 03880, Fourth Dept 6-27-25

Practice Point: The plaintiff in this rear-end collision case made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which preserved the issue of defendant’s negligence for appeal. The appellate court held defendant was negligent as a matter of law. The matter was remitted for a trial to determine proximate cause (there was a car between defendant’s and plaintiff’s cars) and, if necessary, damages.

 

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IN THE ABSENCE OF A MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BY THE DEFENDANTS, THE JUDGE... ALTHOUGH A REVIEW OF POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS BY A PANEL OF SENIOR PROSECUTORS...