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THE DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON BY RETIRED NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES TO PROVE THE CITY PROMISED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH MEDICARE SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR LIFE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS PROMISE; THEREFORE THE RETIREES WERE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THEIR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CAUSE OF ACTION (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, determined the petitioners were not entitled to judgment on the promissory estoppel cause of action. Petitioners are retired New York City employees who argued the city had promised to provide them with Medicare supplemental insurance coverage for life. In 2021 the city made significant changes to its health benefits program, discontinuing its most popular program, Senior Care, and most other options, and enrolling retirees in a Medicare Advantage Plan (MAP) managed by Aetna Life Insurance Company:

To support the allegation of a clear and unambiguous promise of Medicare supplemental insurance coverage for life, petitioners submitted copies of Summary Program Descriptions (SPDs) that the City provides its employees and retirees on an annual basis to inform them of their health insurance options. * * *

The SPDs themselves contain nothing that could be construed as a clear and unambiguous promise of Medicare supplemental insurance coverage for life. To the contrary, we agree with the City that the language in the SPDs is descriptive and for informational purposes only. The language on which petitioners rely—”becomes eligible,” “is provided,” “provides,” and “supplements”—is in the present tense. The descriptive nature of the SPD is reflected in the title of the document—Summary Program Description—and its informational nature is also clear from the context of the SPD, the purpose of which is to explain benefits for the upcoming year. Indeed, annual SPDs are necessary only because benefits change from year to year, a fact petitioners do not contest. Petitioners rely heavily on the phrase “and thereafter” in the SPDs as conclusive evidence of a continuing promise, but read in context this language is used only to explain when someone is eligible for Medicare and not in reference to any promise of future benefits. To the extent that one might infer a commitment of sorts from the SPDs’ language, it does not rise to the level of a clear and unambiguous promise that the City would pay for Medigap coverage, as opposed to some other form of health insurance coverage, for the rest of every retiree’s life. Matter of Bentkowski v City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 03690, CtApp 6-18-25

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for insight into the proof requirements for a “clear and unambiguous promise,” in the context of promissory estoppel.

 

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