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THE BANK’S UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO REVOKE THE ACCELERATION OF THE DEBT IS PRECLUDED BY THE FORECLOSURE ABUSE PROTECTION ACT (FAPA) WHICH APPLIES RETROACTIVELY TO THIS CASE; THE FORECLOSURE ACTION IS TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a letter from the bank in this foreclosure action purporting to revoke a prior acceleration of the debt did not stop the running of the six-year statute of limitations. The action was therefore time-barred. The Second Department noted that the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), effective December 30, 2022, applies retroactively to this case. The FAPA essentially provides that once the debt is accelerated the six-year statute of limitations keeps running despite any attempt to “unilaterally waive, postpone, cancel, toll, revive or reset the accrual” of the foreclosure action:

Applying FAPA here, the revocation letter did not de-accelerate the mortgage debt nor did it “revive or reset” the statute of limitations … . Since the plaintiff commenced this action more than six years after the initial acceleration of the mortgage debt, the defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them as time-barred (see CPLR 213[4] …). US Bank Trust, N.A. v Horowitz, 2025 NY Slip Op 03095, Second Dept 5-21-25

Practice Point: Here the bank attempted to revoke a prior acceleration of the debt by sending defendants a “revocation letter.” The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which applies retroactively to this case, rendered the attempted revocation a nullity. Therefore the letter did not stop the running of the six-year statute of limitations and the foreclosure action was time-barred.​

 

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