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IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE ALLEGING DAILY SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER, THE PLAINTIFF’S AND A FACULTY MEMBER’S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE TEACHER’S PROPENSITY FOR ABUSE AND THE ABUSE ITSELF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant school district’s motion for summary judgment in this Child Victims Act case should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged daily sexual abuse by a teacher. The school district submitted plaintiff’s deposition transcript and a faculty member’s deposition transcript in support of the summary judgment motion. The plaintiff’s allegations of daily abuse and the faculty member’s testimony that students had informed him of the abuse and he believed other teachers were aware of the abuse raised questions of fact about negligent hiring and retention of the teacher and negligent supervision of the plaintiff:

In support of their motion, the defendants submitted … a transcript of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff, who testified that over the course of the school year, while he was in the seventh grade, he was sexually abused by the teacher daily and that the teacher’s abusive propensities were common and open knowledge in the middle school’s community. The defendants also submitted a transcript of the deposition testimony of a faculty member who was employed by the school district at the same time as the teacher, who testified that students had informed him that the teacher engaged in inappropriate conduct and that he believed other teachers were aware of said alleged conduct. Therefore, the defendants’ own submissions demonstrated the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged abuse of the plaintiff and of the teacher’s alleged abusive propensities and as to whether the defendants’ supervision of the plaintiff and the teacher was negligent … . Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, the court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers … . T.F. v Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 2025 NY Slip Op 03042, Second Dept 5-21-25

Practice Point: In Child Victims Act cases alleging frequent sexual abuse by a teacher, courts are increasingly willing to hold that the plaintiff’s allegations of frequent abuse alone are sufficient to raise a question of fact about constructive notice on the part of the school.

 

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