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THE 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR FILING AND SERVING A NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH RUNS FROM THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR; HERE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS TIMELY FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH CAUSE OF ACTION; HOWEVER THE 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSCIOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING AND PREIMPACT TERROR RUNS FROM THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT; THE NOTICE OF CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN REJECTED AS UNTIMELY FOR THOSE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the application to deem a notice of claim timely served for the conscious pain and suffering and preimpact terror causes of action in this pedestrian-bus-accident wrongful-death case should not have been granted. General Municipal Law 50-e provides that a notice of claim alleging wrongful death is timely filed and served within 90 days of the appointment of an administrator; that requirement was met here. The notice of claim was therefore timely for the wrongful death cause of action. However the wrongful-death notice-of-claim provision in General Municipal Law 50-e does not apply to the conscious pain and suffering and preimpact terror causes of action. The Second Department held that the notice of claim should have been rejected as untimely for those two causes of action:

Here, [defendant] NYCTA [New York City Transit Authority] did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claims of conscious pain and suffering or preimpact terror within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day statutory period … . “As a general rule, knowledge of an accident or occurrence by a municipality’s police or fire department cannot be imputed to another public or municipal corporation” … . Furthermore, the case file did not indicate that anyone associated with NYCTA acquired actual knowledge of essential facts constituting the subject claims.

As to the other relevant factors, the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her failure to timely serve a notice of claim … . The petitioner also failed to meet her initial burden of presenting “some evidence or plausible argument” … to support a finding that NYCTA will not be substantially prejudiced by the approximate six-month delay from the expiration of the 90-day statutory period until the commencement of this proceeding … . Matter of Egalite v New York City Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 02773, Second Dept 5-7-25

Practice Point: A notice of claim for wrongful death is timely filed and served within 90 days of the appointment of an administrator pursuant to General Municipal Law 50-e (a) (1). However, that statutory provision does not apply to causes of action for conscious pain and suffering and preimpact terror. Notices of claim for those causes of action must be filed and served within 90 days of the accident.

 

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