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AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, THE SHERIFF’S DEPUTY WAS ENGAGED IN AN EMERGENCY OPERATION AND DID NOT ACT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the police vehicle (driven by Deputy Fong) which collided with plaintiff’s vehicle was engaged in an emergency operation and was not being operated in reckless disregard for the safety of others. The dissenters argued there was a question of fact on the “reckless disregard” issue:​

… [I]t is undisputed that the reckless disregard standard of care applies because Fong was driving an emergency vehicle and was engaged in an emergency operation at the time she proceeded through the red traffic signal (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [b] [2]). In addition, defendants established that Fong’s conduct did not rise to a level of reckless disregard for the safety of others. Defendants’ submissions established, in particular, that Fong took several precautions before proceeding into the intersection against the red traffic signal, including bringing her vehicle to a complete stop, looking in all directions, activating her emergency lights, and proceeding slowly into the intersection … . Granath v Monroe County, 2025 NY Slip Op 02521, Fourth Dept 4-25-25

 

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