You are here: / / THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF DO NOT APPLY TO...

THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF DO NOT APPLY TO A SLIPPERY SUBSTANCE ON A LADDER, REQUIRING THE DISMISSAL OF A LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined certain provisions of the Industrial Code did not apply to a slippery substance on a ladder, requiring the dismissal of a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action:

The court should have dismissed the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim … on the basis that the Industrial Code provisions on which plaintiffs rely are inapplicable or abandoned. Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7 (d) does not apply to this case because the ladder from which plaintiff fell “was not ‘a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface'” … . 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) and (2) do not apply because there is no evidence that Thomas “tripped over any materials, debris or equipment” … . 12 NYCRR 23-1.21 (b) (3) (iv) is limited to structural defects in ladders … and does not apply to the slippery substance on the ladder in this case … . D’Angelo v Legacy Yards Tenant LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 02409, First Dept 4-24-25

Practice Point: A ladder is not a “floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface” within the meaning of the Industrial Code section 12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7 (d).

Practice Point: Industrial Code sections12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) and (2) address tripping over “materials, debris or equipment” and does not apply to a slippery substance on a ladder.

Practice Point: Industrial Code section 12 NYCRR 23-1.21 (b) (3) (iv) applies to structural defects in ladders and does not apply to a slippery substance on a ladder.

 

You might also like
PETITIONER ALLEGED HIS ARREST WARRANT WAS BASED UPON FALSE ATTESTATIONS AND SOUGHT TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM ALLEGING FALSE ARREST, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; THE CITY WAS DEEMED TO HAVE HAD TIMELY NOTICE OF THE ACTION BY VIRTUE OF THE CITY-PERSONNEL’S INVOLVEMENT IN DRAFTING THE WARRANT AND SUBSEQUENT REPORTS; THE REQUEST TO FILE A LATE NOTICE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​
Plaintiff, a Monitor in a Golf Program, Assumed the Risk of Injury in a Golf-Cart Accident
MOTION IN LIMINE CANNOT BE USED TO DETERMINE AN ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT, THE MOTION WAS ACTUALLY AN UNTIMELY MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
THE JURORS IN THIS ATTEMPTED ROBBERY CASE SAW AN INTERNET VIDEO OF DEFENDANT’S CODEFENDANT VIOLENTLY CAUSING A MAN’S DEATH; THE VIDEO HAD NOT BE INTRODUCED OR MENTIONED AT TRIAL; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT (FIRST DEPT). ​
EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY CONSTITUTED A BINDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED 1ST DEPT.
PAIN AND PRESENCE OF BULLET FRAGMENTS FOUR YEARS AFTER THE SHOOTING WAS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY, DISSENT DISAGREED (FIRST DEPT).
CITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT BASED UPON THE HANDLING OF A DECEASED PERSON DURING HURRICANE SANDY AND NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH THE CITY (FIRST DEPT).
STAND-ALONE EXECUTIVE LAW 63 (12) CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD REINSTATED AGAINST DONALD TRUMP ET AL.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE USE OF POST-DISCHARGE AFFIDAVITS FROM TWO JURORS, CLAIMING JUROR CONFUSION,... THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE COURT SHOULD USE ITS AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE JUVENILE...