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THE FLOOR OF THE ELEVATOR WHERE PLAINTIFF’S ACCIDENT OCCURRED IS NOT A “PASSAGEWAY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the floor of an elevator is not a “passageway” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. Therefore the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action based upon an Industrial Code provision requiring that “passageways” be kept free from dirt, debris and other obstructions was inapplicable, However, the code provision requiring “floors” and “platforms” be kept free from scattered tools, etc., did apply to elevators:

Supreme Court should have granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claim insofar as it was predicated on 12 NYCRR § 23-1.7 (e) (1). That regulation provides, as relevant here, “All passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping.” A passageway for purposes of this regulation “mean[s] a defined walkway or pathway used to traverse between discrete areas as opposed to an open area” … . The elevator in which plaintiff’s accident occurred cannot be considered a walkway or pathway, and therefore cannot constitute a passageway within the meaning of the regulation … . Smith v Extell W. 45th LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 04533, First Dept 9-24-24

Practice Point: The floor of the elevator where plaintiff’s accident occurred is not a “passageway” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. Therefore the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action alleging a violation of the “passageway” code provision should have been dismissed.

 

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