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AN ATTORNEY REPRESENTING A SCHOOL-EMPLOYEE-UNION-MEMBER IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT CAN NOT BE LIABLE IN MALPRACTICE TO THE UNION MEMBER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the attorney (Guerra) who represented a union can not be held liable in malpractice to individual union members in disciplinary proceedings:

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2), a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as the cause of action is preempted by federal law … . Here, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the complaint insofar as asserted against Guerra is preempted by section 301 of the Federal Labor Management Relations Act, and that attorneys such as Guerra who perform services for and on behalf of a union may not be held liable in malpractice to individual grievants such as the plaintiff where the services performed constitute part of the collective bargaining process … . Klingsberg v Council of Sch. Supervisors & Adm’rs-Local 1, 2020 NY Slip Op 02083, Second Dept 3-25-20

 

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