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HERE THE COMPLAINT STATED A CHILD-VICTIMS-ACT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE STATE; THE STATE ASSUMES A DUTY OF PROTECTION AGAINST HARM FOR A CHILD IN ITS CUSTODY; THE COMPLAINT WAS NOT DEFECTIVE FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE STATE OWED PLAINTIFF A SPECIAL DUTY, OVER AND ABOVE THAT OWED THE GENERAL PUBLIC (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Aarons, over a concurrence, determined the complaint in this Child Victims Act action alleging sexual abuse while under the care of the state should not have been dismissed. The issue was whether the complaint must allege a special duty owed by the government to the plaintiff. The Third Department found that a special duty need not be alleged to survive a motion to dismiss under the facts alleged:

A cause of action for negligence requires proof that defendant owed the claimant a legally recognized duty, that “defendant breached that duty and that such breach was a proximate cause of an injury suffered by the [claimant]” … . That said, “an agency of government is not liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function unless there existed a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public” … . “A special duty can arise in three situations: (1) the plaintiff belonged to a class for whose benefit a statute was enacted; (2) the government entity voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally; or (3) the municipality took positive control of a known and dangerous safety condition” … . Claimant does not dispute that he has not pleaded one of those three bases for a special duty, instead contending that he was not required to so plead because he was in OCFS’s [Office of Children’s and Family Services’] custody.

We agree. Mindful that our review requires us to determine “whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory” … , claimant’s failure to plead a special duty is not fatal to the extent his claim alleges negligence in the performance of obligations stemming from OCFS’s custody of him during his placement at the Schenectady facility … . When a government entity assumes custody of a person, thus diminishing that person’s ability to self-protect or access those usually charged with such protection, that entity owes to that person a duty of protection against harms that are reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances … . The duty of protection is coextensive with the entity’s “physical custody of and control” of the person, terminating at the point the person passes out of the “orbit of [the entity’s] authority” … . Thus, we have held that “[a] governmental foster care agency is under a duty to adequately supervise the children in its charge and will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision,” including “negligence in the selection of foster parents and in supervision of the foster home” … . A.J. v State of New York, 2024 NY Slip Op 04231, Third Dept 8-15-24

Practice Point; When the state assumes custody of a child, it owes the child a duty of protection against harm. Under the facts of this case, the plaintiff was not required to alleged the state owed a special duty to the plaintiff.

 

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FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT REQUIREMENTS IN THE BUILDING-CONSTRUCTION... ALTHOUGH THE SEXUAL ABUSE COUNT WAS FACIALLY VALID, THE VICTIM’S TESTIMONY...