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IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR A MOTION TO DISMISS BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF THE DECEASED DEFENDANT BY DECEDENT’S FORMER ATTORNEYS WHO HAD NOT BEEN SUBSTITUTED FOR THE DECEDENT; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO HAVE DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER SUBSITITUTED AS A REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE DECEDENT REQUIRED NOTICE TO ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN DECEDENT’S ESTATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the death of the defendant in this traffic accident case divested the court of jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss by the decedent’s former attorneys, who had not been substituted for the decedent, should not have been considered by the court. The Appellate Division also noted that plaintiff’s motion to substitute decedent’s daughter as a representative for the decedent required notice to all persons interested in decedent’s estate:

“The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a proper substitution has been made pursuant to CPLR 1015(a). Moreover, any determination rendered without such substitution will generally be deemed a nullity” .. . “The death of a party terminates his or her attorney’s authority to act on behalf of the deceased party” … . Although the determination of a motion pursuant to CPLR 1021 made by the successors or representatives of a party or by any party is an exception to a court’s lack of jurisdiction, here, the motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint was made by the former attorneys for the decedent purportedly on behalf of the decedent. Since the former attorneys lacked the authority to act, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion … . Accordingly, so much of the order as granted the motion purportedly made on behalf of the decedent is a nullity.

Further, any motion pursuant to CPLR 1021 requires that notice be provided to persons interested in the decedent’s estate … . Here, the plaintiff failed to provide notice to persons interested in the decedent’s estate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff’s cross-motion with leave to renew upon service on persons interested in the decedent’s estate. Fazilov v Acosta, 2024 NY Slip Op 03470, Second Deppt 6-26-24

Practice Point: Here the defendant in a traffic accident case died. The decedent’s former attorneys did not have the authority to make a motion to dismiss and the court should not have considered it.​

Practice Point: Here plaintiff’s motion to have decedent’s daughter substituted for decedent required notice all persons interested in decedent’s estate.

 

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