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A DECEASED PARTY’S ADMISSIONS ARE NOT HEARSAY AS AGAINST THAT PARTY’S ESTATE AND SUPPORT THE PETITIONER-ESTATE’S CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST CLAIM; THE ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT ESTATE WAS PRESENT DURING DISCUSSIONS AT THE HEART OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST CLAIM AND MUST BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman, determined summary judgment dismissing the constructive trust cause of action and denying the motion to disqualify counsel because he would necessarily be a witness should not have been granted. Mother, Isabel, alleged, as Medicaid planning, she transferred $1.6 million to her daughter, Jody, to be held by Jody during Isabel’s lifetime and then distributed equally among Jody and her two siblings. Jody, however, predeceased Isabel. Upon learning the accounts set up by Jody had only $255,000 in them, Isabel asserted a claim against Jody’s estate for $2 million. Subsequently Isabel died. The lawyer who represents Jody’s executor in the instant proceedings, Leibowitz, took notes during a telephone conference among himself, Isabel and Jody when the Medicaid planning transfer was discussed. The facts are too complex to fairly summarize here. Suffice to say that there was sufficient evidence that Jody had made admissions concerning the Medicaid planning agreement which is the basis for the constructive trust cause of action. Jody’s admissions are not excludable as hearsay against her estate. The First Department also concluded Leibowitz’s status as witness required his disqualification:

… [A]n admission by a party is admissible against that party, as an exception to the hearsay rule, as evidence of the matter asserted in the admission, whether or not the party’s statement was against his or her interest at the time the statement was made … . Moreover, “[a]dmissions of a testator or intestate are competent against the estate” … . Accordingly, admissions by Jody are competent evidence against Jody’s executor, the representative of her estate. * * *

… [T]he 2009 notes reflect that Leibowitz discussed with Jody and Isabel the transfers at issue in this case, and Robert [Isabel’s son and executor of her estate] may examine Leibowitz at trial about Jody’s statements to him concerning any agreements, understanding or promises between herself and Isabel relating to those transfers. While it cannot be determined at this juncture whether Leibowitz’s testimony will be of material assistance to Robert in proving his claim, it remains the case that Leibowitz discussed matters related to that claim with Jody, and his recollections of Jody’s statements will be admissible against Jody’s executor as admissions. Because Leibowitz should be a witness in this case, his continued representation of Jody’s executor in this proceeding violates the advocate-witness rule and disqualification pursuant to rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct is appropriate. Matter of Newman, 2024 NY Slip Op 03544, First Dept 6-27-24

Practice Point:  A deceased party’s admissions are not hearsay as against that party’s estate.

Practice Point: An attorney who will be called as a witness for the opposing party must be disqualified under the advocate-witness rule.

 

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ALTHOUGH SUCCESSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS ARE DISFAVORED; HERE THE ISSUES... AS PLAINTIFF WAS REMOVING DUCTS FROM THE CEILING, A PORTION OF A DUCT STRUCK...