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THE COVID FORECLOSURE MORATORIUM INSTITUTED BY HUD FOR FHA INSURED MORTGAGES APPLIED TO RENDER THE REVERSE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IN THIS CASE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Miller, addressing a question of first impression, determined that the COVID foreclosure moratorium instituted by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) which stayed foreclosures on mortgages issued by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) applied to render an action to foreclose a reverse mortgage timely:

Courts and the legal community are now likely familiar with the 2020 executive orders that tolled time limitations due to the COVID-19 pandemic … . On this appeal, we are asked to consider another governmental pause on business as usual that was spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 18, 2020, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereinafter HUD) instituted a COVID-19-related moratorium that effectively stayed foreclosures with respect to mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (hereinafter FHA). This moratorium (hereinafter the FHA COVID-19 moratorium) remained in effect until July 31, 2021. This appeal presents an issue of apparent first impression for an appellate court in this State, namely, whether the statute of limitations for commencing a foreclosure action may be tolled by virtue of the FHA COVID-19 moratorium. We hold that the FHA COVID-19 moratorium, which constituted a stay of foreclosures of federally backed mortgages, may indeed toll the statute of limitations for commencing a foreclosure action, and, on the facts of this case, the FHA COVID-19 moratorium did toll the applicable limitations period. Given the benefit of the toll, one of the defendants timely commenced a separate but related action to foreclose a home equity conversion mortgage, also known as a reverse mortgage, and the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, seeking to quiet title, brought by the alleged owner of the property encumbered by the reverse mortgage. Trento 67, LLC v OneWest Bank, N.A., 2024 NY Slip Op 03198, Second Dept 6-12-24

Practice Point: Here the COVID foreclosure moratorium instituted by HUD for FHA-insured mortgages rendered the reverse mortgage foreclosure timely.

 

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