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DEFENDANT WAS NOT AN OWNER OR A GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND EXERCISED NO SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER THE INJURED PLAINTIFF’S WORK, THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED; HOWEVER DEFENDANT MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING THE ALLEGEDLY DANGEROUS CONDITION DURING PRIOR WORK ON THE PROPERTY; THEREFORE THE COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMSSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that, although the Labor Law causes of action were properly dismissed, the common-law negligence cause of action should not have been dismissed. Defendant BHI was not an owner of the property or a general contractor and was not present on site when plaintiff was injured. The injured plaintiff worked for another prime contractor. But BHI had previously done the work which allegedly caused plaintiff’s injury. Because BHI was not an owner or a general contractor and had no supervisory authority on the day of the accident, the Labor Law causes of action did not apply. But the common-law negligence cause of action was applicable:

A defendant that is not an owner, general contractor, or agent pursuant to the Labor Law with regard to a plaintiff’s work may nonetheless be held liable to the plaintiff under a theory of common-law negligence “where the work” the defendant “performed created the condition that caused the plaintiff’s injury” … . “An award of summary judgment in favor of a subcontractor [or prime contractor] dismissing a negligence cause of action is improper where the evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to whether [it] created an unreasonable risk of harm that was the proximate cause of the . . . plaintiff’s injuries” … . Delaluz v Walsh, 2024 NY Slip Op 03030, Second Dept 6-5-24

Practice Point: This case illustrates why it is a good idea to allege a common-law negligence cause of action in addition to a Labor Law 200 cause of action.

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