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THE “SHEPPARD-MOBLEY” BAR TO A MOTHER’S RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL HARM IF HER BABY IS BORN ALIVE DOES NOT APPLY TO A LACK-OF-INFORMED CONSENT, AS OPPOSED TO A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CAUSE OF ACTION; HERE MOTHER ALLEGED SHE DID NOT CONSENT TO TWO UNSUCCESSFUL VACUUM EXTRACTION ATTEMPTS WHICH PRECEDED THE C-SECTION; HER BABY DIED EIGHT DAYS AFTER BIRTH (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Rodriguez, over a partial dissent, determined plaintiff’s lack-of-informed-consent cause of action properly survived defendant doctor’s (Grimaldi’s) motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff mother alleged she did not consent to the two unsuccessful vacuum extraction attempts which preceded the C-section delivery of her baby. The baby died eight days after birth. The First Department questioned the continued relevance of Sheppard-Mobley v King, 4 NY3d 627 (2005) which held, in an action for medical malpractice, mother cannot recover for emotional harm if the baby is born alive. The First Department distinguished Sheppard-Mobley on the ground that the instant action alleges a lack of informed consent, not ordinary medical malpractice:

This appeal concerns, among other issues, whether Sheppard-Mobley v King (4 NY3d 627 [2005]) (Sheppard-Mobley) and related cases bar a plaintiff mother’s claim for emotional harm resulting from lack of informed consent for certain prenatal procedures. We hold that they do not.

Sheppard-Mobley held that a mother’s damages for emotional harm could not be recovered on a cause of action for ordinary medical malpractice where the child was born alive and in the absence of independent physical injury to the mother. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim based on lack of informed consent—a separate theory of recovery that, under the circumstances, implicates different interests than the ordinary medical malpractice claim at issue in Sheppard-Mobley—is distinguishable.

In addition, assuming [for the sake of argument] the rule of Sheppard-Mobley applies to claims for ordinary medical malpractice and lack of informed consent alike, we are of the opinion that the rule should be revisited. * * * Now almost 20 years after Sheppard-Mobley, further consideration is warranted with respect to whether a mother may recover for emotional damages resulting from physical injuries to her fetus or infant during pregnancy, labor, or delivery caused by medical malpractice or lack of informed consent. SanMiguel v Grimaldi, 2024 NY Slip Op 02881, First Dept 5-23-24

Practice Point: Here the First Department held that the bar to mother’s recovery for emotional harm if her baby is born alive does not apply to a lack-of-informed consent, as opposed to a medical malpractice, cause of action.

 

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