You are here: / / PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THEY PAID A BROKER FOR THE INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED BY...

PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THEY PAID A BROKER FOR THE INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED BY DEFENDANT INSURER BUT THE INSURER CANCELLED THE POLICY FOR NONPAYMENT; THE INSURER ALLEGED THE BROKER WAS NOT IN THE CHAIN OF BROKERS LEADING FROM PLAINTIFFS TO THE INSURER; QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant-insurer’s (Interstate’s) motion for summary judgment in this “wrongful policy cancellation” suit should not have been granted. Plaintiffs alleged they paid a broker for the policy issued by Interstate . The premiums never reached Interstate. Interstate alleged the broker was not in the chain of brokers leading from plaintiffs to Interstate. The policy was cancelled for nonpayment:

Plaintiffs allege that they paid a broker the initial premium for the excess liability coverage issued by defendants, and that the broker also procured a financing agreement for them for the balance of the premiums. The party financing the premiums paid the broker on plaintiffs’ behalf and plaintiffs complied with the financing agreement. Plaintiffs’ president testified that plaintiffs only dealt with that broker, who delivered the policies to them. However, the premiums never reached defendants, who canceled the policies. Thereafter, three persons were killed during the term of the policies in an accident on plaintiffs’ premises when the decedents inhaled hydrogen sulfide fumes (the accident). Defendants disclaimed coverage.

Where an insured makes timely payment to a broker in the chain of brokers and the insurer delivers the policy to the broker pursuant to the broker’s request, Insurance Law § 2121 precludes the insurer from canceling the policy based on nonpayment of premiums where the broker did not remit the payment to the insurer … .

Here, the record is replete with triable issues of fact as to whether the broker with whom plaintiffs state they dealt was in the chain of brokers leading from plaintiffs to Interstate, such that the payment of the premiums to the broker was sufficient to bind Interstate. Plaintiffs referred to the testimony of their president that the broker was the only broker used by them, and that the broker’s employee delivered the policies to them. Moreover, the premium checks were made payable to the broker, who prepared a loss summary, and no evidence was presented demonstrating that another broker delivered the policies to plaintiffs. However, the absence of significant paperwork naming the broker cited by plaintiffs as a broker in the transaction, the testimony of the wholesale brokers that they did not deal with the broker cited by plaintiffs and would not do so, and the Notice of Excess Line Placement naming a different entity as plaintiffs’ broker, raise questions that preclude summary judgment in favor of either plaintiffs or Interstate. Royal Waste Servs., Inc. v Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 03616, First Dept 6-25-20

 

You might also like
PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S RAISING AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN A RELATED FEDERAL ACTION.
MOTION TO DISMISS SUIT SEEKING RETURN OF A PAINTING ALLEGEDLY LOOTED BY THE NAZI-OCCUPIED FRENCH GOVERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT).
Hearsay in Medical Records Should Have Been Redacted/Not Relevant to Diagnosis and Not Clearly Attributable to Plaintiff as an Admission
MUNICIPAL DEFENDANTS NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY BICYCLE-RIDING IN PUBLIC PARK, DESPITE REGULATIONS PROHIBITING BICYCLE-RIDING; QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HIRED TO CARE FOR THE CHILD WHO STRUCK INFANT PLAINTIFF WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE CHILD’S FATHER (RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR) OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR; QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE DEFENDANT CARE-GIVER WAS NEGLIGENT IN SUPERVISING THE CHILD (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST A SECURITY COMPANY HIRED BY KMART SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED IN A FIGHT WITH A KMART EMPLOYEE, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN KMART AND THE SECURITY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF DID NOT RELY ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SECURITY COMPANY’S DUTIES, AND THE SECURITY COMPANY DID NOT FULLY DISPLACE KMART’S DUTY TO PROVIDE SECURITY (ESPINAL FACTORS) (FIRST DEPT).
Term “Entrustment” in a Policy Exclusion (In the Context of Entrustment of Property to Another) Interpreted to Encompass Entire Leased Premises
WITHOUT PROOF DEFENDANT USED, ATTEMPTED TO USE, OR THREATENED TO USE THE BOX CUTTER FOUND IN HIS POCKET, THERE WAS NO PROOF THE BOX CUTTER MET THE DEFINITION OF A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT (FIRST DEPT)
DEFENDANT’S ALLEGED FAILURE TO REPAY MONEY PAID BY PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT TO A CONTRACT WHICH HAD BEEN TERMINATED STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONVERSION, FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS BASED UPON NON-ACTIONABLE FUTURE EVENTS AND NON-ACTIONABLE OPINION ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS RE: DEBRIS IN PASSAGEWAYS... DEFENDANT ALLEGED DEFENSE COUNSEL OVERSTATED THE RISK OF DEPORTATION CAUSING...