You are here: / / HERE FAMILY COURT HAD THE INHERENT POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER RESPONDENT...
, ,

HERE FAMILY COURT HAD THE INHERENT POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS THE CHILD’S FATHER; RESPONDENT WAS JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM CONTESTING PATERNITY BASED ON HIS POSITION IN A PRIOR PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court had the power to determine whether father (Gunderson) is responsible for the support of the child and father was judicially estopped from contesting paternity because he was awarded parental access in a prior proceeding:

… [T]he Support Magistrate, sua sponte, dismissed the mother’s petition without prejudice on the ground that the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order of child support because the parties were never married and there was no acknowledgment of parentage or order of filiation. * * *

… [B]ecause the Family Court has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual parent is responsible for the support of a child (see Family Ct Act § 413[1][a]), in appropriate cases, it also has the inherent authority to ascertain whether a respondent is a child’s parent … .

Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, “a party who assumes a certain position in a prior legal proceeding and secures a favorable judgment therein is precluded from assuming a contrary position in another action simply because his or her interests have changed” … . Here, Granderson successfully obtained an order awarding him parental access with the child based on his assertion that he was a parent to the child. Matter of Joseph v Granderson, 2024 NY Slip Op 01921, Second Dept 4-10-24

Practice Point: Here, based upon Family Court’s authority to determine whether a parent is responsible for the support of the child, Family Court had the inherent authority to determine whether respondent is the child’s father.

Practice Point: Here respondent sought and was awarded parental access in a prior proceeding. He was judicially estopped from contesting paternity in this proceeding.

 

You might also like
PEDESTRIAN STRUCK WHILE LAWFULLY IN CROSSWALK ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED.
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL HAD NOTIFIED ALL PARTIES HE WAS NO LONGER REPRESENTING PLAINTIFF, THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF AN ATTORNEY OF RECORD HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWED, THEREFORE THE STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF PRO SE WAS NOT VALID.
Intoxication Jury Instruction Was Warranted, Conviction Reversed
AVILA WAS INJURED WHEN HER SPOUSE LOST CONTROL OF THE CAR AND STRUCK A PARKED CAR; THE POLICY EXPRESSLY STATED COVERAGE DID NOT EXTEND TO THE INSURED’S SPOUSE; IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS PROVISION THE INSURER IS NOT REQUIRED TO COVER THE INSURED’S SPOUSE (SECOND DEPT).
COUNTY PROTECTED BY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IMMUNITY, COMPLAINT ALLEGED MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT TRAFFIC CONTROL.
THE PROOF DID NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE ASSAULT SECOND AND CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON THIRD CONVICTIONS WERE BASED ON SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ACTS, THEREFORE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WERE NOT WARRANTED; DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER BASED ON A NEW JERSEY CONVICTION WHICH WAS NOT A FELONY IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT). ​
Requirements for Common Law Indemnification and Contribution Causes of Action Explained
IF THE SORA COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VICTIM’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, WHICH WAS NOT DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENDANT, WAS ERROR, UNDER THE FACTS, IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE COURT MAY ORDER A PARENT TO SUBMIT TO COUNSELING OR TREATMENT AS PART OF... DEFENDANT, WHO WAS SUFFERING FROM MENTAL ILLNESS, WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER; THE...