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A MANAGING AGENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR INJURY CAUSED BY A DANGEROUS CONDITION ON THE MANAGED PROPERTY UNLESS THE MANAGING AGENT EXERCISES COMPLETE AND EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER THE OPERATION OF THE PROPERTY (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the property managing agent did not exercise complete and exclusive control of the operation of the property and therefore could not be held liable for plaintiff’s trip and fall over a stub-up pipe protruding from a step:

Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against CBRE [the managing agent] on the ground that CBRE does not own, operate, or control the premises. “Where, as here, a managing agent is accused of nonfeasance which causes injury to a third party, it is subject to liability only where it has complete and exclusive control of the management and operation of the property in question” … . “A managing agent is not in complete and exclusive control of the premises where the owner has reserved to itself a certain amount of control in the written agreement” … .

Here, CBRE established, prima facie, that it was a managing agent of the premises and that the management agreement was not so comprehensive and exclusive as to displace the duty of the owner of the premises to maintain the premises safely … . Quezada v CBRE, Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 01829, Second Dept 4-3-24

Practice Point: A managing agent is not liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition on the managed property unless the agent exercises complete and exclusive control over the operation of the property.

 

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