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UNDER THE UNIQUE FACTS OF THIS MED MAL TRIAL, DEFENDANTS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO SHIFT LIABILITY TO PHYSICIANS WHO HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRIOR TO TRIAL (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Warhit, determined defendant doctor and hospital in this med mal case did not attempt at trial to shift liability to the physician-defendants who had been awarded summary judgment before trial. The opinion is fact-specific and therefore will not be summarized here. The issue is discussed in detail and relevant authority is analyzed in some depth:

The principal question presented on this appeal is whether the defendants improperly attempted at trial to shift liability to certain physician-defendants who had been awarded summary judgment prior to trial. We answer this question in the negative, and find that the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the application of the plaintiff … , in effect, for a new trial on this ground. We further conclude that the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. Angieri v Musso, 2024 NY Slip Op 00887, Second Dept 2-21-24

Practice Point: Under the specific facts brought out at trial in this med mal case, the plaintiff did not attempt to shift liability to doctors who had been awarded summary judgment prior to trial. The issue and the relevant authority are discussed in some detail.

 

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