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THE CONTRACT CALLED FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AS THE “SOLE REMEDY” FOR BREACH; HOWEVER NOTHING IN THE CONTRACT LANGUAGE WAIVED THE NONBREACHING PARTY’S RIGHT TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST PURSUANT TO CPLR 5001(A) (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kapnick, reversing Supreme Court, determined the contract language, which provided that liquidated damages constituted the “sole remedy” for breach, did not waive the nonbreaching party’s  right to prejudgment interest pursuant to CPLR 5001 (a):

At issue in this appeal is whether the parties’ contract language specifying that purchaser’s “sole remedy” in the event of sellers’ breach is the return of its downpayment constitutes a clear waiver of CPLR 5001 (a) as defined by the Court of Appeals in J. D’ Addario & Co., Inc. v Embassy Indus., Inc. (20 NY3d 113 [2012]) and requires denying the nonbreaching party statutory prejudgment interest. … [W]e conclude that it does not and hold that CPLR 5001 (a) requires that plaintiff …, the nonbreaching purchaser, be awarded prejudgment interest on its $626,250.00 downpayment, at the statutory rate of 9% … . IHG Harlem I LLC v 406 Manhattan LLC,2024 NY Slip Op 00164, First Dept 1-16-24

Practice Point: The contract provided that liquidated damages constituted the “sole remedy” for breach. However, nothing in the contract language indicated the nonbreaching party’s right to prejudgment interest pursuant to CPLR 5001 (a) was waived.

 

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