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​PLAINTIFF’S FIRST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE NYS HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; PLAINTIFF’S SECOND COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE SAME STATUTE; THE SECOND COMPLAINT WAS NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff stated a cause of action for employment discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Plaintiff had filed a prior complaint which was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff then filed the instant complaint under the same statute by on different grounds. The instant complaint was not precluded the the doctrine of res judicata:

… [T]his cause of action was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. That doctrine “precludes a party from relitigating a claim that has been finally adjudicated on the merits” …  “Although, generally, a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action based on the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading is not a dismissal on the merits, and does not bar the adequate repleading of the claim in a subsequent action, such a determination has preclusive effect as to a new complaint for the same cause of action which fails to correct the defect or supply the omission determined to exist in the earlier complaint” … . The first cause of action alleged in the present complaint was distinct from that alleged in the prior action, the latter of which was based upon an alleged failure of the defendants, among others, to provide a reasonable accommodation in the form of certain medical leave, as well as retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. Thus, the dismissal of those causes of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7) did not bar the first cause of action asserted in the present complaint. Duchemin v Village of E. Hampton, 2023 NY Slip Op 06350, Second Dept 12-13-24

Practice Point: Here the first complaint alleging employment discrimination was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. That is not considered a dismissal on the merits. Therefore the second employment-discrimination complaint, brought under the same body of law, was not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.

 

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