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PLAINTIFF REAL ESTATE BROKER’S CAUSES OF ACTION (SEEKING THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION) AGAINST THE BUYERS WHO SUBSEQUENTLY BOUGHT THE PROPERTY USING A DIFFERENT BROKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE QUANTUM MERUIT, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND FRAUD CAUSES OF ACTION WERE NOT MADE OUT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the quantum meruit, tortious interference with contract and fraud causes of action should have been dismissed. Plaintiff, a real estate broker, had made an offer on sellers’ property on behalf of the Sorkin defendants which was rejected. Subsequently the Sorkin defendants, using a different broker, made another offer on the sellers’ property which was accepted. Plaintiff sued for the brokerage commission. The tortious interference with contract cause of action should have been dismissed because the Sorkins did not procure a breach of contract. The quantum meruit cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff was not a proximate, as opposed to a remote and indirect, link to the consummation of the sale. The fraud cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff could not have detrimentally relied on any alleged misrepresentation by the Sorkins that they were not longer interested in the property:

… [T]he Sorkin defendants demonstrated … that the plaintiff’s sole efforts consisted of some brief contacts with the sellers and the Sorkin defendants, and that after the sellers rejected the offers obtained by the plaintiff from the Sorkin defendants, no further negotiations took place between the plaintiff and the sellers regarding a possible sale to the Sorkin defendants. Subsequently, the sellers negotiated a sale of the subject property to the Sorkin defendants through a different broker, and the sale was consummated. Consequently, the Sorkin defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff was “not the direct and proximate link, as distinguished from one that is indirect and remote, between the bare introduction of the sellers to the buyers and the consummation of the sale” … . * * *

[Re: fraud:] Even if the Sorkin defendants misrepresented to the plaintiff that they were no longer interested in purchasing the subject property, there could be no “specific detrimental reliance by plaintiff on this misrepresentation, inasmuch as plaintiff could not have compelled the [Sorkin defendants] to speak with plaintiff” … . City RE Group, LLC v 2633 Ocean Realty, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 05586, Second Dept 11-8-23

Practice Point: Although plaintiff real estate broker briefly introduced the buyers to the sellers and submitted an offer which was rejected, plaintiff could not sue for the real estate commission when the buyers submitted another offer through another broker which was accepted. Plaintiff could not make out causes of action for quantum meruit, tortious interference with contract or fraud (based upon the allegation the buyers misrepresented to plaintiff that the were no longer interested in the property).

 

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